Kimberly Marten: What Is Putin Thinking?

Q. What is Putin trying to accomplish in Syria?

A. I don’t think there is a clear answer. My best theory is that he is trying to demonstrate his ability to support a foreign client and make the U.S. look bad at a time when he needs to show other leaders within his domestic coalition that he is still strong. The Assad regime has been a client of Moscow’s since 1971, it buys weapons from Russia, and Russia has a naval supply and repair facility in Syria. But Syria accounts for only about 5 percent of Russian arms sales, and there’s no evidence that its ability to buy Russian arms was in jeopardy, or that the naval facility could be reconfigured any time soon into a base for force projection elsewhere, especially given the state of Russia’s economy.

I have wondered all along whether the timing of Putin’s actions indicates that Russian military involvement in Syria was a pay-off to Iran, for Iran going along with the nuclear nonproliferation deal. Russia’s support was necessary to get Iran to sign off on it, and Russian troops appeared in Syria right after it became clear that the U.S. was going to approve the Iran deal.

Assad is fighting against his own Sunni population. Some Islamist extremists from Russia’s North Caucuses who are also Sunni have gone to fight against the Syrian regime. So Putin has argued that he’s in Syria to fight Islamist extremism. But Putin’s actions in Syria could provoke Russia’s own Islamist rebels to take further acts of terrorism inside Russia. So he is taking on enormous costs with no clear anti-terrorism benefit.

Q. What’s going on at home that would encourage Putting to get sucked into the Middle East?

A. Putin’s basic bargain with the Russian state has fallen apart. The deal was that he would crack down domestically in return for allowing wealth generation. Now the Russian economy is in decline because of the collapse of international oil prices. Furthermore, the situation in Ukraine hasn’t gone as Putin wanted, and international sanctions are still in place against Russia. As the leader of a patron/client regime at home, Putin must constantly demonstrate to people in his political milieu that he is still strong and capable of holding things together. The most convincing way of looking at what’s happening is that Putin is like a gambler on a losing streak, taking on ever bigger risks to try to make up for what he has lost.

Q. Does anyone in Russia really care about Syria?

A. What is happening in Syria is not directly threatening Russia. Then again, you could ask a similar question, why does the U.S. care about Syria? It’s indirect whatever it is. There are Islamic State rebels who could potentially threaten Russia, but then you would expect Putin to actually be going after the ISIS rebels and that’s not what’s happening.

But those who are trying to analyze Russian national interests miss the fact that there is no discussion of Russian national interests within Russia. Before Putin makes any decision there is no discussion about what that decision should be, and after he makes it there is no discussion about what the decision was. Russia doesn’t have any functioning policy making institutions, so policy choices depend on his personal connections. Rather than looking for Russian national interest we should be looking for Putin’s interests.

Q. Does he have an end game?

A. Putin is not a chess-player; he’s a tactical, not a strategic, thinker. I think the chances that Putin will put in enough military support to actually keep the Assad regime functioning are relatively small. The Russian economy just can’t support that kind of foreign adventure for long. He is not fighting primarily against ISIS. There is evidence that he struck some ISIS bases, but he is mostly striking American-supported rebels in Syria and Russian jets have repeatedly violated Turkish airspace, which was stupid and apparently intentional. I think it’s very good to be questioning what in the world Putin is thinking.