Economics and incentives are a critical part of the design of layer-1 blockchain protocols such as Ethereum. For example, scarce resources like blockspace require careful pricing. Block rewards, transaction fees, and MEV must be shared across the stakeholders in the system, and those carrying out the protocol must be incentivized appropriately. Subtle game theory governs the interactions between block builders, block proposers, and the end users. Many of these economic and game-theoretic challenges are specific to the blockchain application domain, necessitating new models, new mechanisms, and new analysis frameworks.
This one-day workshop will bring together practitioners, researchers, and academics to discuss challenges, recent progress, and opportunities in the economics of blockchain protocols, with an emphasis on the problems currently faced by the Ethereum ecosystem.
Columbia University and the Ethereum Foundation
Columbia University: Ciamac Moallemi and Tim Roughgarden
Ethereum Foundation: Justin Drake, Barnabé Monnot, and Danny Ryan
GOAL: to improve the economics and incentives in permissionless blockchain protocols
FORMAT: a mix of short presentations, panel discussions, and interactive breakout sessions
Please check in for this event at Carleton Commons (Mudd Building 4th Floor - Campus Level) before heading over to Davis Auditorium.